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LET THERE BE NO NAGGING DOUBTS:
NOR SHALL PRIVATE PROPERTY,
INCLUDING WATER RIGHTS,
BE TAKEN FOR PUBLIC USE
WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATIONt
Charles E. Corker*

F

RAN:K Trelease thinks that when the United States needs
water and must acquire it by drying up a water right already in use the United States should pay for it. He says,
"The only issue is who should bear the loss and pay the
costs." 1 The final words of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution answer his question with respect to
private property generally, and I know of no reason why water
rights should be different from other property; nor do I know
of any proposal to repeal the Fifth Amendment; or why water
flowing from national forests should be different from water
flowing from private lands, state lands, federally acquired
lands, or the Province of British Columbia; or why compensability for a federal taking of water rights in Wyoming, because Wyoming is a public land state, should be different from
compensability for a federal taking of water rights in Massachusetts and Texas, where all federally owned lands have been
acquired by the Government after statehood.
The portion of the title after the colon might have been: "nor shall private
property [, including water rights,] be taken for public use, without just
compensation." It occurred to me that there may be a special criminal law,
like those against using the flag for advertising, to punish those who interpolate their own language into the Constitution. Quoted words are those
of the Fifth Amendment.
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law; A.B., 1941,
Stanford University; L.L.B., 1946, Harvard University; Member of the
California Bar Association.
1. See, Trelease's discussion commencing at page 89 of this volume.

t

CopyrightO 1971 by the University of Wyoming

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

1

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 1, Art. 12

110

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

Arguments about "the reservation doctrine" could almost
be dismissed as an absurdity, except that very earnest federal
lawyers have earnestly and successfully made them in federal
courts. Now that the Public Land Law Review Commission
has announced that 61 per cent of the water in eleven western
states comes from federal lands, and that the reservation doctrine is real, we may find that the problem is principally
hydrological. We may find Congress directing the United
States Geological Survey to install an analyzing station on the
Green River of Wyoming to determine the percentage of the
flow of that river which is federal, and the percentage which
is nonfederal. Doubtless the percentages vary from year to
year, depending on distribution of snowpack, and from early
in the year to late in the year, depending on places the maximum rate of snow melt is seasonally taking place.
All great men-the Public Land Law Review Commission,
Dean Trelease, Commissioner John A. Carver, Jr., the founding fathers who wrote the Bill of Rights, and I-agree about
the principle of compensability. Perhaps our agreement should
make this entire discussion unnecessary. But Trelease expresses what he calls "nagging doubts" about whether the
PLLRC Report has really discovered a solution. I associate
myself with his doubts. My doubts do more than nag. They
relate to four proposals said by the PLLRC not to abolish the
reservation doctrine, but to dispel its uncertainty.
1. The first clarification and limitation Congress is
asked to make is to require federal land agencies to ascertain
and give public notice of their projected water requirements
for the next 40 years for reserved areas, and forbid the assertion of a reservation claim for any quantity of water not
included within such public notice. Congress is unlikely, I
think to do this, and if it did, it would be a questionable use
of public funds.
A public notice that the Ashley National Forest may
without compensation increase its use of runoff by X acre-feet
per year by the year 2010 A.D., or X tenths of one per cent of
the total run-off, might solve a Forest Service problem. But
the problem Dean Trelease described is not that of the Forest
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/12
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Service, but of a Mrs. Glenn who claimed water supplied by
Bear Creek, flowing from the Ashley Forest, and who has no
concern with the 362,999,999 acre-feet of run-off from public
lands elsewhere in the west, including the Ashley National
Forest not tributary to Bear Creek.
And if the proposed inventory is to identify future federal
claims from the thousands of Bear Creeks, and Warm, Yellow,
and Black Springs-as the inventory must if the inventory is
at all useful-its preparation will be an absurdity. Mrs.
Glenn's collision with the Forest Service could not possibly
have been predicted in 1930. The future collision to take place
in 2010 between the Forest Service and Mr. McGillicuddy cannot possibly be predicted in 1970. It would be wasteful to devote the time of able and devoted Forest Service people to
this kind of enterprise. Its cost would be many times the cost
of paying for a water right if needed 30 or 40 years from now.
2. The Commission recommends that "procedures for
contesting each claim should be provided." Of course, this is
true. And the need for procedures-and a definitive forumis not confined to claims under the reservation doctrine. The
principle was accepted by the MeCarranAmendment which,
in 1953, waived sovereign immunity of the United States. 43
U.S.C. § 666.
The McCarranAmendment doesn't work very well. This
is only partly because it is badly drafted. It will take the skill
and judgment of Frank Trelease-and I say this so that he
will not mistake his responsibilities as a consultant to the
National Water Commission to see that he gets this job doneto figure out what to do and how to do it. Elwood Mead, territorial state engineer of Wyoming, taught us what I think is
the essential part of the problem-judges unspecialized in
water administration are not equipped to handle water rights
adjudications. The only federal judicial or quasi-judicial official now in sight is a federal judge.
3. The Commission recommends that future withdrawals
and reservations of public lands be accompanied by "a statement of prospective water requirements and an express
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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reservation of such quantity of unappropriated water." There
is nothing wrong with that recommendation. But if you go
back to 1872, when Yellowstone Park was reserved from the
public lands, and imagine that someone was in that year required to project Yellowstone Park's water consumption and
use as of 1912 (40 years in the future) or as of 1970, you would
recognize two things: First, Yellowstone Park's problems
since 1872 have been manageable without intervention of the
reservation doctrine, in any of its mysterious forms. Second,
to handle the new National Park's water requirements by
means of the reservation doctrine, with added improvements
suggested by the Public Land Law Review Commission, would
have been a cumbersome method recommending itself principally to the inventive genius of Rube Goldberg.
4. Finally, the Commission recommends that "compensation should be awarded where interference results with
claims valid under state law before the decision in Arizona v.
California," which means before June 1963. Trelease has
spotted the drafting problem, which is in essence that under
the reservation doctrine no state water rights were valid on
that date as against federal reserved claims. This one can be
handled if Trelease drafts the law carefully to define "valid."
My complaint is that even if he does supply the draftsmanship, the proposal still makes little sense. The reservation doctrine, as a matter of federal constitutional power to
reserve water for any valid federal purpose, was solidly established in 1908 with Winters v. United States.2 Moreover,
I cannot think that it serves any useful purpose to propose
that Congress now establish two kinds of federal rights (and
hence two kinds of state law water rights) -pre-1963 and
post-1963.
Having said all this, let me say with emphasis that the
PLLRC Water Report would be an improvement if acted
upon; that all Trelease's strictures and all my own are quibbles about how best to achieve treatment of water rights as
property rights, protected by a viable substitute for the Fifth
Amendment, from the reservation doctrine. But the question
2. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
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of how best to do the job is the very one which has prevented
doing anything but talk about the reservation doctrine since
the Pelton Dam decision in 1955.1
Let me pay respects to the Pelton Dam decision. It was a
poor decision I think, but primarily because it did violence to
express terms of the Federal Power Act. But in that respect,
it was not significantly worse than FirstIowa4 before it, which
related to navigable waters. Senator Neuberger of Oregon
proposed an amendment to the Federal Power Act which
would correct the Court's error, but his amendment captured
no enthusiasm at all.' Congress having acquiesced in the construction of the statute for 15 years, Pelton Dam is now good
law.
But with respect to what the Supreme Court decided in
that case, or even what it clearly said, Pelton Dam stands only
for the proposition that Oregon has no interest in its unappropriated waters which would give the state power to prevent
federal licensing and construction of Pelton Dam by Portland
General Electric. Oregon as a state has no power to exact
compensation for unappropriated waters, but not even that
question was involved in Pelton Dam or in Arizona v. California.' In both cases, no compensation was sought.
3. F.P.C. v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955). Debate over the "reservation doctrine"
with Department of Justice lawyers really amounts, I think, to swapping
"fears and doubts" about what may happen, but hasn't happened yet. The
"navigation servitude," is a topic where examples can be discovered by state
law enthusiasts of bad things which have already happened. This fear
swapping is a dangerous game on both sides, because someone's horrible
example can become tomorrow's reality.
The federal lawyer's best "horible example" of almost raiding the treasury in the name of water rights in the name of state law, is Grand River
Dam Authority v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 153 (Ct. Cl. 1959) (3-2 decision, rev'd., 363 U.S. 229 (1960). The lawyer who both solves, and then sells
his solution to the federal-state controversy must not risk reversing the result (as distinguished from the doctrine) of the Supreme Court's decision.
Suggested possible solution: No water right shall be compensable except to
the extent of present beneficial use (which can be federally defined) plus
the presently discounted value of the right under state law to make a future
use within a reasonable (or a defined) time, and under generally applicable
state law which does not discriminate against federal projects.
4. First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Cooperative v. F.P.C. 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
5. Corker, Water Rights and Federalism-The Western Water Rights Settlement Bill of 1957, 45 CAiF. L. REv. 604, 624, n. 70 (1957).
6. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Special Master expressly
left open the question, not argued, if compensation might be due from the
United States as a result of the Mexican Treaty. Master's Report, p. 296
(1960).
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I will, however, pay my respects to the Federal Power
Commission, because it is my particular honor and pleasure to
share a platform with John A. Carver, Jr. It is the first time
since John and I walked across a platform together in 1935
when we graduated from Boise High School. This, although
we have been college roommates and closest life-long friends.
Here are my two questions to Commissioner Carver
which he can think of as my law school examination:
1. Does Portland General Electric, licensee of Pelton
Dam on the Deschutes River, have a water right by reason of
its FPC license? (If his answer is no, I am sure Portland
General Electric Co. may hear of it, and its counsel will be
nervous. Furthermore, Pelton Dam is a very large hydroelectric investment not to have any kind of water right.)
2. The second is a question reached only if the answer
to the first is either yes, or maybe. Suppose that the unappropriated water above Pelton Dam, in addition to the water required for the dam, is sufficient to supply two, but not three
new projects. The Oregon State Engineer authorizes appropriations of water for all three projects.
In some forum-maybe the Federal Power Commission,
maybe an Oregon administrative agency, maybe a state court,
or maybe a federal court-a decision must be made which of
the three new projects (or even on old project?) on the Deschutes River above Pelton Dam must be sacrificed to keep
Pelton Dam generating kilowatts. Who shall make that decision, and where is the body of law that determines how that
decision shall be made?
I shall give you the right answers but not less than six
months after both Carver and Trelease have answered. But I
hope they will not reply too quickly. These questions are really
prepared for the next occasion when I find a lawyer for Uncle
Sam who weasels his statement of the reservation doctrine or
the navigation servitude as limiting water rights of private
parties only "against the United States."
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss1/12
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If no right to 363 million acre-feet of water from federal
public lands in 11 western states is good "against the United
States," the power of some decision maker to allocate the cost
and damage from federal projects becomes completely arbitrary, however benignly it may be exercised. And both the
principle and terms of the Fifth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, that private property shall not be taken
without just compensation, are directed first and primarily
against the United States.
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